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n the Latin West the theme of “Moses and the magicians” is well 
known. Exodus 7: 8-13 tells us the following:
The Lord told Moses and Aaron, “If Pharaoh demands that 
you work a sign or wonder, you shall say to Aaron: Take your 
staff and throw it down before Pharaoh, and it will be changed 
into a snake.” Then Moses and Aaron went to Pharaoh and did 
as the Lord had commanded. Aaron threw his staff down be-
fore Pharaoh and his servants, and it was changed into a snake. 
Pharaoh, in turn, summoned wise men and sorcerers, and they 
also, the magicians of Egypt, did likewise by their magic arts. 
Each one threw down his staff, and it was changed into a snake. 
But Aaron’s staff swallowed their staffs (Saint Joseph Edition of 
the New American Bible).
The biblical account makes clear that the changing of a staff into 
a snake, which originally looked like a miracle intended to validate 
Moses’ claim to be sent by God, was easily duplicated by each magi-
cian. Therefore, it was not really a very telling prophetic miracle. 
In the end what validates Moses’ claim is that the snake produced 
by his brother and spokesperson Aaron swallowed the magicians’ 
snakes. This story points to the need for determining what differ-
entiates miracles from magic.
The Qur’ân also tells the story of Moses and the magicians 
and al-Ghazâlî, the greatest Sunni Muslim intellectual, who died in 
1111, refers to it several times and, therefore, he too ponders about 
miracles and magic. But before moving to al-Ghazâlî I shall briefl y 
explain how two Latin philosophers, Bonaventure and Peter Ab-
elard, deal with the story of “Moses and the magicians” in order to 
better understand that thinkers both in the Latin Christian world or 
in Islamic lands faced the same issues, i.e., such as explaining 1. how 
miracles or magic are possible; 2. how one can distinguish miracles 
from magic; and 3. whether “miracles” such as the changing of a 
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staff into a snake constitute a solid ground to accept as veracious a 
prophetic claim and so be moved to faith.1
Let us begin with an explanation of how the changing of the 
staff into a snake can happen and whether it really comes about by 
a direct intervention of God. In the twelfth century Peter Lom-
bard’s Book of Sentences became the Theology Textbook for centu-
ries. Therein, at II, d. 17, c.3, Lombard speaks of Moses changing 
his staff into a snake and of the creation of Adam as an adult. He 
concludes that Adam was not made by inferior causes but rather by 
the will and power of God, as they were no seminal reasons pre-
ceding his creation. Lombard’s next distinction treats of woman’s 
creation from Adam’s rib.2 In his Commentary on this latter article 
of the Book of Sentences, II, d. 18, art. 1, q. 2, Bonaventure examines 
whether woman was created from Adam’s rib by a causal reason, i.e., 
directly by divine intervention, or according to natural or seminal 
reason, and so without direct divine intervention. Bonaventure care-
fully makes a triple distinction between ways things are produced, 
at least when terms are used stricto sensu. First, causal reason in-
dicates direct divine intervention and so a miracle, when the event 
is unusual. Second, seminal reason does not require direct divine 
intervention and the product is not similar to the producer. Third, 
natural reason does not require direct divine intervention and the 
product is similar to the producer, as for example dogs producing 
puppies and cats kittens.
Bonaventure argues that woman was created by causal reason, 
i.e., by direct intervention from God and not by seminal reasons. 
Why? If something is produced by seminal reasons or nature, any-
one who has the appropriate knowledge theoretically can repeat or 
duplicate the process or event as from the very beginning, by means 
of a seminal reason, the being to be produced was already present in 
1. A very generous and scholarly referee, whom I cannot thank enough, makes the impor-
tant point that Jewish philosophers, such as Gersonides in the Wars of the Lords, VI, 
12 & 10, and Maimonides in his Mishneh Torah. Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah VIII, 
1-3, and the Guide of the Perplexed, III, 24, raise the sane issues. 
2. P. LOMBARDI, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, 3rd ed., Tomi. I, Pars II. (Editiones 
Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, Grottaferrata, 1971) 412-13, 416-21.
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inchoate state in nature and so no direct causal divine intervention is 
required. Except for God, no one is able to produce a woman out of 
a male rib and so this was the result of direct divine intervention and 
a miracle. On the other hand, not only were Moses and Aaron both 
able to change their staff into a snake but so were the magicians. So 
turning a staff into a snake is a repeatable process and not the ef-
fect of a direct divine intervention, though it constitutes an unusual 
event that happened according to seminal reasons as the product, 
snakes, was not similar to the producers, magicians.3 In contrast 
when snakes beget snakes, as they usually do, then the effect is by 
natural reason. It follows that there are two non-miraculous ways of 
producing snakes.
In the same discussion Bonaventure makes another point about 
miracles by distinguishing the natural slow process of the eating of 
bread and its long term effect in the production of a human being 
according to seminal reason from the immediate and instantaneous 
turning of bread into the body of a man that is according to causal 
reason and, therefore, miraculous.
If mediate, the effect can be said to be according to a seminal 
reason, as is the case if the bread is eaten and digested and 
converted into a humor, and afterwards in the loins is turned 
into semen and then into a man. If, on the other hand, it im-
mediately goes on to produce its effect, as is the case where 
bread is immediately formed into the body of man, it is said 
to do this not according to seminal reason but according to 
causal reasons.4
3. S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, Tom. II (Quaracchi, 1885) 436: “Unde appropriate 
loquendo, cum magi ex virgis fecerunt serpentes, hoc fuit secondum rationes semi-
nales; cum vero serpentes, sicut assolent, serpentes generant, hoc fi t secundum 
rationes naturales.”
4. A. B. WOLTER (trans.) in J. F. WIPPEL, A. B. WOLTER (eds.), Medieval Philosophy: 
From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa (The Free Press, New York, 1969) 322; 
Latin (Quaracchi ed., 1885) 437.
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In other words when an ordinary process that occurs according to 
seminal reasons and normally takes a fair amount of time suddenly 
occurs instantaneously, then there was a direct divine intervention 
and a miracle occurred. The miracle consists in the speeding up of 
the process and no one other than God can do so. 
Bonaventure has given us two criteria in order to distinguish 
true miracles: 1. they cannot be duplicated by ordinary human be-
ings; 2. they must be instantaneous, whereas, if there is some ordi-
nary parallel process, this process would be long drawn.
Bonaventure’s triple distinction of causal, seminal, and natural 
reasons allowed him to explain miracles and distinguish them from 
ordinary or magical processes. Let us now turn to Peter Abelard to 
determine whether what appears as a miracle, the changing of a staff 
into a snake, should be the basis for the act of faith.
In the second part of Abelard’s Collationes or Dialogue between 
a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, the Philosopher addresses the 
Christian and quotes the gospels “For the Jews ask for signs and the 
Greeks are looking for wisdom” in order to denigrate the value of 
miracles and berate the Jews. He then claims in forceful and rude 
language: 
In fact, only the Jews, because they are animal and sensual and 
aren’t educated in any philosophy whereby they can discuss 
reasons, are moved to faith by miracles in outward deeds alone. 
As if God alone can do these things, and no demonic illusion 
can occur with them! The magicians in Egypt taught them, and 
Christ especially instructed you, how stupid it is to admit that..5
For Abelard’s Philosopher as for Bonaventure the problem with this 
type of “miracle” is that ordinary human beings can duplicate them 
and so how do we distinguish a true miracle from magic or demonic 
illusion? So for Abelard’s Philosopher such a “miracle” or “sign” is 
5. P. V. SPADE (trans.), in PETER ABELARD, Ethical Writings (Hackett, Indianapolis, 
1995) 94, n. (154); Latin, PETER ABELARD, Collationes, in J. MARENBON, G. OR-
LANDI (eds. and trans.) n. 69 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001) 86.
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unsafe for moving to faith and he can only rely on the wisdom of 
the Greeks. As for what Abelard himself thinks on this topic I shall 
not hazard a guess.
As in the biblical account the magicians too could turn their 
staffs into snakes, such a miracle raises the questions of how to ex-
plain this phenomenon, how to distinguish a miracle from magic 
or demonic illusion, and whether to rely on such a miracle to be 
moved to faith.
Let us now move to al-Ghazâlî and begin with the Qur’ânic 
account that may surprise you. In fact, the Qur’ân four times refers 
to “Moses and the magicians.” I have selected the account in Surah 
20, 65-70, as it is the clearest for my purpose. The magicians have 
been summoned by Pharaoh in order to duplicate Moses’ turning 
of a staff into a serpent and here is the scene:
65. They [the magicians] said: “O Moses! Whether wilt thou 
That thou throw (fi rst) Or that we be the fi rst To throw? 66. 
He [Moses] said, “Nay, throw ye First!” Then behold Their 
ropes and their rods So it seemed to him On account of their 
magic—Began to be in lively motion! 67. So Moses conceived 
In his mind a (sort of) fear. 68. We [God] said: “Fear not! For 
thou hast indeed The upper hand: 69. “Throw that which is 
In thy right hand: Quickly will it swallow up That which they 
have faked What they have faked Is but a magician’s trick: And 
the magician thrives not, (No matter) where he goes. 70. So 
the magicians were Thrown down to prostration: They said, 
“We believe In the Lord of Aaron and Moses”.6
The striking difference between the biblical and Qur’ânic accounts 
concerns the serpents. In the Bible both Aaron and the Magicians 
produce real snakes, whereas in the Qur’ânic account the magicians 
fail to produce real snakes and only manage to produce something 
that seems to be in a lively motion but in fact is not. What they 
6. A. YUSUF ALI (trans. and comm.), The Holy Qur’an (American Trust, Indianapolis, 
1977) 802-03.
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produce in 7:117 is described as “lies or fabrications” (mâ iâfi kûna), 
whereas Surah 26:32 makes it clear that Moses’s staff turned into a 
real serpent (hiyâ thu’bânun mubînun). The Arabic clearly indicates 
that the magicians did not succeed in producing real serpents. So 
strictly speaking in the Qur’ân the turning of a staff into a serpent 
is not repeatable. Here we have a “true” miracle that the magicians 
could not duplicate. So how does al-Ghazâlî handle “Moses and the 
magicians?” First, does he try to explain how the miracle and the 
magicians’ trick are possible? Second, does he give criteria to distin-
guish miracles from magic or deception? Third, does he claim that 
such a miracle should move to faith? 
In his famous autobiography, al-Munqidh, often known in 
English as Deliverance from Error, al-Ghazâlî insists early on that 
his continuous drive for the intellectual life comes from his love of 
understanding and his search for certitude:
The thirst for grasping the real meaning of things was indeed 
my habit and wont from my early years and in the prime of my 
life. It was an instinctive, natural disposition (fi tra) placed in 
my make up by God Most High, not something due to my own 
choosing and contriving. As a result the fetters of “taqlîd”—
blind conformism—, fell away from me, and inherited beliefs 
lost their hold on me.7
Comparing this passage to the fi rst terse line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
yields interesting results, particularly as al-Ghazâlî most probably had 
no access to those lines . In Aristotle the line goes “all human beings 
by nature desire to understand” and, as we just saw, al-Ghazâlî too 
speaks of his drive for understanding. Yet, there are signifi cant dif-
ferences: 1. Aristotle speaks of a desire common to all human beings, 
whereas al-Ghazâlî speaks in his own name, even if we will soon dis-
7. R. J. MCCARTHY (trans.) (with a modiﬁ cation), Freedom and Fulﬁ llment: An An-
notated Translation of Al-Ghazâlî’s al-Munqidh min al-Dalâl and Other Relevant 
Works (Twayne, Boston, 1980) 63, n. (6); Arabic, AL-GHAZÂLÎ, in F. JABRE (ed.), 
Al-Munqid min adalâl (Erreur et Délivrance) (Commission Libanaise pour la Tra-
duction des Chefs-d’Oeuvre, Beirut, 1969) 10.
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cover that he too thinks this drive is common; 2. Aristotle claims that 
the desire to understand is by nature, without explaining its origin. If, 
despite “fi tra”’s Qur’ânic aura, we may in some way equate Aristotle’s 
nature and al-Ghazâlî’s “instinctive, natural disposition,” we notice 
that al-Ghazâlî does not hesitate to claim that God put such “fi tra” in 
his makeup. Al-Ghazâlî even specifi es that this drive is not of his own 
choosing and so attributes it fully to God’s action; 3. Though in the 
lines that follow his claim that “All human beings by nature desire to 
understand” Aristotle illustrates how this desire for understanding is 
at work in every human being from infancy, he does not at all imply a 
need for rejecting some distortion that has spoiled this natural desire. 
Al-Ghazâlî, on the other hand, indicates that the original “fi tra” was 
spoiled by “taqlîd”8, blind formal acceptance and conformism, which 
affects not only most people, but even affected him; and 4. Aristotle 
simply speaks of a desire to understand, but al-Ghazâlî will add that 
his thirst for understanding must lead not only to abandoning “taqlîd” 
but also to striving for certitude.
But what led al-Ghazâlî to begin an intellectual journey that re-
quires rejection of “taqlîd” and not a focus simply on understanding 
but rather a quest for certainty? Very young al-Ghazâlî was struck by 
religious diversity and the fact that kids of Muslims became Muslims, 
kids of Jews Jews, kids of Christians Christians, and kids of Magians 
Magians. Religious diversity, of course, led him to wonder which 
religion was the true one as their diverse truth claims were incom-
patible, and his observation that parents determined their children’s 
religion also led him to consider that religious persuasion was just a 
matter of “taqlîd” or blind conformism. Yet, he never doubted that 
there is a sound “natural disposition” (fi tra) common to all human 
beings, and not simply his own private gift, even if somehow it may 
get distorted by “taqlîd” to parents’ religious option. In order to jus-
tify his trust in a sound common “fi tra”, he quotes the hadith “every 
infant is born endowed with the “fi tra”; then his parents make him 
8. R. M. FRANK, Al-Ghazâlî on Taqlîd. Scholars, Theologians, and Philosophers, 
“Zeitschrift für die Geschichte der arabish-islamischen Wissenschaften” 7 (1991-
92) 207-52.
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Jew or Christian or Magian.” The hadith seems to exclude Mus-
lim children from distortion of the “fi tra”, even if al-Ghazâlî himself 
claims that he was affected by “taqlîd” as were most Muslim intellec-
tuals. Yet, this “fi tra” given to every infant by God himself grounds 
the possibility of certitude. Therefore, the “taqlîd” that distorts it 
must need be abandoned in order to begin the quest for certainty. 
But what is certainty? Al-Ghazâlî himself defi nes it:
Then it became clear to me that sure and certain knowledge 
is that in which the thing known is made so manifest that no 
doubt clings to it, nor is it accompanied by the possibility of 
error and deception, nor can the mind even suppose such a 
possibility.9
Immediately al-Ghazâlî adds that something known with certainty 
is such that even a miraculous counterclaim cannot shake it:
Furthermore, safety from error must accompany the certainty to 
such a degree that, if someone proposed to show it to be false—
for example a man who would turn a stone into gold and a stick 
into a snake—his feat would not induce any doubt or denial. For 
if I know that ten is more than three, and then someone were to 
say: “No, on the contrary, three is more than ten, as is proved by 
my turning this stick into a snake”—and if he were to do just that 
and I were to see him do it, I would not doubt my knowledge 
because of his feat. The only effect it would have on me would 
be to make me wonder how he could do such a thing. But there 
would be no doubt at all about what I knew!10
Notice that, as no rational argument could make anyone doubt that 
ten is more than three, an elementary truth in the sure and certain 
knowledge of arithmetic, al-Ghazâlî imagines a feat that looks like 
a miracle, even Moses’ famous miracle, though curiously such feat 
9. R. J. MCCARTHY, op. cit., 63, n. (7); Arabic, 11.
10. R. J. MCCARTHY, op. cit., 63-64, n. (7); Arabic, 11.
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would not be performed to back up a claim for prophecy. He fi rst 
speaks of the alchemist’s dream of turning a stone into gold but then 
moves to Moses turning his staff into a serpent, using the Qur’ânic 
word for the staff (al-‘asan), which appears in various accounts, as 
well as the word used in surah 26, The Poets, verse 32, to refer to 
Moses’ serpent (thu’bân). No one could miss the Qur’ânic allusion. 
The way al-Ghazâlî refers to this turning of a stick into a snake is 
quite fascinating. He indicates that his knowledge that ten is more 
than three would not be shaken in any way, even if the challenger, 
more accomplished than the magicians, were able to duplicate what 
Moses did and so to produce a real serpent. Al-Ghazâlî here is not 
comparing the feat of the challenger to the tricks, fabrications, or 
lies of the magicians but to Moses’ production of a real serpent. He 
would wonder how the challenger could do such a thing but his 
certainty would not be shaken at all.
One may think that al-Ghazâlî interprets allegorically Moses’ 
miracle and thereby bypasses the issue of explaining its literal mean-
ing, but this turns up to be a dead end. In Fadâ’ih al-Bâtiniyya wa 
Fadâ’il al-Mustazhiriyya or The Infamies of the Bâtinites and the Virtues 
of the Mustazhirites, ch. 5, he roundly condemns the Bâtinites’ al-
legorical interpretations of what he considers clear passages in the 
Qur’ân and among them lists Moses turning his staff into a serpent. 
The Bâtinites read the Qur’ânic passage in the following manner:
The staff of Moses is his proof which swallowed their lying 
sophisms, not the wood.11
As al-Ghazâlî clearly rejects an allegorical interpretation of Moses’ 
turning of a staff into a serpent, we need to look at his ways of ex-
plaining miracles and for that we turn to the seventeenth discussion 
in The Incoherence of the Philosophers. This discussion begins with 
arguing that there is no way to prove that there is a necessary con-
nection between what is usually believed to be a cause and what is 
11. R. J. MCCARTHY (trans.), Freedom and Fulﬁ llment, 209, n. (110); Arabic, A. BADAWI 
(ed.), (Dâr al-qawmiyya, Cairo, 1964) 57.
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usually believed to be its effect. That something always happens 
along with something else, such as fi re in contact with and the burn-
ing of a piece of cotton, does not prove contact with fi re to be the 
cause of the burning but simply that the two events are concomitant. 
From there al-Ghazâlî goes on to deal with “causal” explanations 
by means of two different theories, which both leave space for the 
possibility of miracles. The fi rst is based on strict occasionalism and 
the other on secondary causes and the existence of natures. The 
main miracle al-Ghazâlî uses for these two theories is the case of 
Abraham in the fi ery furnace. The Qur’ân tells us that in his zeal 
for monotheism Abraham destroyed idols and the people got angry 
about this destruction and cast him into the fi re, but God delivered 
him and so he did not burn (21:68-71; 29:24-26 & 37: 97-99).
Let us begin with the fi rst of these theories, occasionalism. 
This was the Ash’arite traditional position. God at every moment 
directly recreates everything and so there are no secondary causes. 
So to go back to the piece of cotton, it is not fi re that burns the 
piece of cotton but God who directly creates the fi re, the piece of 
cotton, the burning, and the ashes, as fi re does nothing. Besides, as 
everything is recreated at every moment and God is fully free, there 
are no natures and theoretically anything could be changed into 
something totally different at any moment. Yet, to ensure regular 
patterns in successive events and the possibility of science and true 
predictions of what we call “natural” events, i.e., what we now call 
laws of nature, the Ash’arites claim that God creates according to a 
habit or custom and that he creates in human beings knowledge of 
this habit or custom. Were God to break his custom or habit, He 
would create in us the knowledge that he will do so, for instance, in 
order to validate a prophetic claim. Explaining how Abraham did 
not burn in the fi ery furnace is easy. For a short time God simply 
broke his habit to connect contact with fi re and the burning of fl esh 
and so did not cause the fi re to burn Abraham. 
If God interrupts the habitual occurrence producing [this unu-
sual event], then at the time when the habitual occurrence is 
interrupted, He removes the knowledge [of the habitual occur-
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rence] from [their] hearts and He does not create it. Nothing 
prevents us from affi rming that, while something is possible for 
God’s power, He knows through His eternal knowledge that 
He will not do it, even though it is possible at a certain time, 
and that He will create for us the knowledge that He will not 
do it at that time.12
God for a short time simply broke his habit of connecting contact 
with fi re and the burning of fl esh in order that Abraham climb out of 
the fi ery furnace without the faintest burn and his claim to prophecy 
be validated.
Examination of the second theory turns out to be more inter-
esting for our purpose. Al-Ghazâlî explains this second theory in the 
following manner:
We admit that fi re is created [by God] in such a manner that 
it will burn two similar pieces of cotton brought into contact 
with it, and [fi re] does not differentiate between them if they are 
similar in every respect. Yet in spite of this, we consider it pos-
sible that a prophet is thrown into fi re, yet is not burned….Heat 
remains with the fi re and fi re retains its form and true nature, yet 
its heat and effect do not pass over [to something else].13
The second theory claims that there are secondary causes and na-
tures, as al-Ghazâlî tells us that God created fi re in such a way that it 
will burn a piece of cotton and that, while Abraham was in the fi ery 
furnace, the fi re retains its form and true nature. Al-Ghazâlî offers a 
couple of suggestions of how it is possible that though both the fi re 
and human fl esh kept their own nature, yet Abraham did not burn. 
One of them is particularly interesting:
12. AL-GHAZÂLÎ, Incoherence of the Philosophers, in A. HYMAN (trans.), Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions, A. HYMAN, J. J. WALSH, 
T. WILLIAMS (eds.) (Hackett, Indianapolis, 2010) 281; Arabic, Tahâfot al-Falâsifat, 
M. BOUYGES (ed.) (Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut, 1927) 286.
13. HYMAN (trans.), op. cit., 281; Arabic, 286-87.
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There comes to be in the body of the person [the prophet], a 
property which, while not keeping the body from being fl esh 
and bone, keeps it from the effect of fi re. [For example,] we see 
that someone covers himself with talc, sits down in a fl aming 
oven, yet is not affected by it. Whoever has not observed this 
will deny it. The denial of the opponent that it is in [God’s] 
power to confer a certain property upon fi re or upon [a per-
son’s] body which prevents burning, is like the denial of some-
one who has not observed talc and its effect. In God’s power 
there are strange and wondrous things, not all of which we 
have observed.14
Notice that al-Ghazâlî’s explanation here suggests that God sim-
ply took advantage of a little known natural property. Apparently, 
people from India had discovered that coating oneself with talc pro-
duces some kind of fi re suit and at fairs fakirs were making money 
demonstrating this fact. 
He also offers a remarkable explanation for another kind of 
miracle that is compatible with secondary causes and the existence of 
natures and this time speaks of Moses’ turning of a staff into a serpent. 
Once again for the staff and the serpent he uses Qur’ânic terms.
The changing of a staff into a serpent is possible in this way 
[as can be seen from the fact] that matter can receive every 
form, so that earth and the other elements can be changed 
into a plant, a plant, when eaten by an animal, is changed into 
blood, blood is changed into semen; and semen, when ejacu-
lated in the womb, creates an animal. This, according to the 
order of habitual occurrences, takes place over a long period of 
time. But why does [our] opponent deny that it is within God’s 
power that matter should pass through these stages in a period 
of time shorter than usual? And if a shorter period of time is 
allowed, there is nothing that keeps it from being the shortest. 
14. HYMAN (trans.), op. cit., 281; Arabic, 287-88.
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As a result these powers are speeded up in their actions and 
through this the miracle of the prophet comes to be.15
Recall that the very same explanation of a speeded up process such 
that what ordinarily takes a long time is now realized in an instant 
was given by Bonaventure, who was not speaking of a staff changed 
into a serpent but of bread being changed into the body of a man. 
Commenting on al-Ghazâlî’s explanation of how God can miracu-
lously speed up and even render instantaneous the passage from the 
elements in wood into a snaking serpent in his recent very interest-
ing book Al-Ghazâlîs Philosophical Theology, Frank Griffel tells us 
that such explanations are not disruptions of the physical course of 
events.16 Yet, I would contend that though the order in the chain 
of causes may remain the same, there is a disruption of the usual 
course of events as what would usually take a long time, is now sud-
denly reduced to an instant. The speeding up is miraculous, just as 
Bonaventure had claimed.
But things become even more interesting. Further down in this 
section al-Ghazâlî tells us:
A horse [is created] only from the semen of a horse, inasmuch as 
its coming to be from a horse determines the preponderance of 
the form of a horse over the other forms and it receives the pre-
ponderant form only in this way. Likewise barley does not come 
from wheat, nor an apple from the seed of a pear. We further see 
kinds of animals, such as worms, which are generated from dust, 
and these do not generate other animals at all. Then there are 
other animals, such as the mouse, the snake, and the scorpion, 
which are both not generated and generated from other animals, 
since they can [also] be generated from dust.17
15. HYMAN (trans.), op. cit., 281; Arabic, 288.
16. Al-Ghazâlî’s Philosophical Theology, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 157. 
Griffel carefully analyzes the seventeenth discussion of the Incoherence, 147-73.
17. HYMAN (trans.), op. cit., 28; Arabic, 290.
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What al-Ghazâlî alludes to with animals generated from dust is 
spontaneous generation. The ancients and the medievals did believe 
that some animals did not reproduce themselves but were emerg-
ing from slime or dust. So, according to al-Ghazâlî, serpents may 
be generated in two ways: by sexual reproduction, the usual mode, 
and by spontaneous generation. The turning of a staff into a ser-
pent could be a speeding up of the natural process of spontaneous 
generation. That serpents may be generated in two ways may also 
explain why Bonaventure had claimed that serpents may be pro-
duced by seminal reasons, as seminal reasons are required to explain 
spontaneous generation, and by natural reasons when serpents beget 
serpents. 
Why does al-Ghazâlî give a fairly naturalistic explanation of 
miracles and in particular of that of Moses turning a staff into a ser-
pent? Does it not indicate that somehow such a feat could be dupli-
cated by someone who would not be a prophet and use it to attempt 
convincing people of a false claim, such as in his thought experiment 
of changing a staff into a serpent in order to support the claim that 
three is greater than ten? Do not al-Ghazâlî’s explanations make it 
very diffi cult to distinguish a miracle from magic or deception?
We may also wonder which of the two theories of causal ex-
planation, occasionalism or that which uses secondary causes and 
natures, he endorses. The traditional view was that al-Ghazâlî was 
a strict Ash’arite and endorsed the fi rst, while he used the second 
simply as an available weapon against Aristotelian philosophers but 
without endorsing it. The late Richard Frank broke this tradition 
in arguing that under the infl uence of Ibn Sînâ (or Avicenna to give 
him his Latin name), al-Ghazâlî abandoned the occasionalism of 
strict Ash’arism in favor of the second theory and so of the existence 
of secondary causes and natures.18 A lively debate ensued between 
him and his friend Michael Marmura who defended the traditional 
interpretation.19 More recently Frank Griffel argued that al-Ghazâlî 
18. Al-Ghazâlî and the Ash’arite School (Duke University Press, Durham, 1994)
19. Ghazâlî on Causes and Intermediaries, “Journal of the American Oriental Soci-
ety”115 (1995) 89-100.
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does not endorse either of the two but considers both as possible 
as they leave space for miracles. Griffel maintains that in fact al-
Ghazâlî is not interested in choosing between these two theories as 
he does not think that miracles can lead to certainty and so should 
not move us to faith. 
As we have now seen how al-Ghazâlî explains the possibility of 
miracles and other wonders, we need to move to our next point. For 
him are miracles really important for establishing religious assent?
Let’s go back to the Munqidh. There al-Ghazâlî asserts that to 
reach sure and certain knowledge of prophecy one should not seek it
…from the changing of the staff into a serpent and the split-
ting of the moon. For if you consider that sort of thing alone, 
without adding the many, indeed innumerable, circumstances 
accompanying it, you might think it is a case of magic and 
deception, and that it was a “leading astray” coming from God 
Most High, because “He leads astray whom He will and rightly 
guides whom He will” (16.95/93).20
The splitting of the moon is a miracle attributed to Mohammed, the 
seal of prophecy. So even in the case of true prophecy a miracle does 
not guarantee “sure and certain knowledge” of the veracity of the 
prophetic claim, just as turning a staff into a snake would not shake 
“sure and certain knowledge” of arithmetic that ten is greater than 
three. Why would a miracle not move to faith? Because it is very 
diffi cult to distinguish a miracle from magic or illusion and there are 
no clear criteria for such a distinction. That Moses’ and Muham-
mad’s miracles are not suitable grounds for faith in prophecy is also 
attested in Al-Qistâs al-Mustaqîm, in English The Correct Balance, 
where he tells us:
I have believed in the veracity of Muhammad—Peace be upon 
him!—and in the veracity of Moses—Peace be upon him!—not 
by reason of the splitting of the moon and the changing of the 
20. R. J. MCCARTHY, op. cit., 100, n. (118); Arabic, 44.
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staff into a serpent: for that way is open to ambiguity, and one 
may not rely on it.21
Later on, in the same text, rhetorically addressing a Bâtinite al-
Ghazâlî speaking of their Imam asks him:
Or does he summon men of insight to follow him blindly, 
when they would not accept the utterance of the Apostle by 
“taqlîd”, nor would they be convinced by the changing of a 
stick into a snake? Rather would they say: “This is an unusual 
feat—but whence does it follow from it that its doer is vera-
cious? Among the marvels of magic and talismans in the world 
is that by which men’s minds are baffl ed, and only he can dis-
tinguish an apologetic miracle from magic and talismans who 
is familiar with all of them and their multiple kinds, so that 
we can know that the apologetic miracle is outside them, just 
as [the] magicians [of Pharaoh] recognized the feat of Moses 
because they were among the masters of magic. And who is 
capable of that?” Rather they would wish to know his verac-
ity from his words [what he says], as the learner of arithmetic 
knows, from arithmetic itself, the veracity of his teacher in his 
saying: “I am an arithmetician.” 22
This last text is very interesting as it moves from the little impor-
tance of “miracles” as distinguishing them from magic or deception 
is so diffi cult, to the certainty of arithmetic grounded not in claims 
made by the mathematics teacher but in arithmetic itself. The 
learner coming to understand arithmetic, a sure and certain science, 
grasps the validity of arithmetic. But sure and certain knowledge 
21. (R. J. MCCARTHY (trans.), Freedom and Fulﬁ llment, 316, n. (100); Arabic, V. CHEL-
HOT (ed.), (Imprimerie Catholique, Beirut, 1959) 81. A kind and learned referee 
indicated that in C. FIELD, The Alchemy of Happiness, (The Octagon Press, Lon-
don, 1908) 118, al-Ghazâlî says: “This is a kind of certainty which requires no 
support from miracles such as the conversion of a rod into a snake, the credit of 
which may be shaken by apparently equally extraordinary miracles performed by 
magicians.”
22. R. J. MCCARTHY, op. cit., 324-25, n. (125); Arabic, 91-92.
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does not stop there. The sure and certain knowledge fi rst sought 
after in various sciences such as logic and mathematics is now moved 
to the veracity of a prophet. This bold move rests on fi rst consider-
ing the discipline of arithmetic, which validates itself so to speak, 
in anyone who understands it, to the veracity of the claim by the 
teacher that he is, indeed, an arithmetician. Likewise prophetical 
words themselves ground sure and certain knowledge of the veracity 
of a claim to be a prophet rather than miracles.
Just as Abelard’s Philosopher al-Ghazâlî himself downplays 
reliance on miracles. Abelard’s Philosopher had argued this view 
from the impossibility of distinguishing a miracle from demonic 
deception as the magicians too had been able to turn their staff into 
a serpent. Despite the fact that the Qur’ân states that the magicians 
were unable to duplicate Moses’ miracle as their serpents were not 
real, al-Ghazâlî takes the same stance of avoiding reliance on mira-
cles. He too claims they are diffi cult to distinguish from magic and 
deception and so outward feats should not lead to religious assent 
as they cannot grant sure and certain knowledge of the veracity of 
a prophetic claim. The two causal theories he presents make room 
for the possibility of miracles but at the same time the second in par-
ticular makes miracles diffi cult to distinguish from rare events from 
which the causes are only known to the magicians or still unknown 
to all human beings. Al-Ghazâlî’s drive for certainty that God be-
stowed on him at birth led him not to rely on miracles or outward 
feats to be moved to faith.
In the end Bonaventure, Abelard, and al-Ghazâlî all under-
stand the great epistemological diffi culty involved in distinguish-
ing miracle from magic or deception and so qua philosophers raise 
similar issues about “Moses and the magicians.”
